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Meet the New Test, Same as the Old Test: In re Spearing
Tool’s Rejection of the Revised Article 9 Rules Means
Secured Creditors Will Get Fooled Again
I. Introduction
According to a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can play by its own rules
when it provides notice of a claimed tax lien on a debtor’s personal property
and benefit from a double standard that is detrimental to the interests of
ordinary secured creditors.  In United States v. Crestmark Bank (In re Spearing
Tool & Manufacturing Co.),1 the Sixth Circuit decided that requiring the IRS
to put a registered organization’s correct name on a federal tax lien notice filed
in the public records is asking too much of the government,2 even though a
secured party must meet this requirement to perfect its interest in a debtor’s
property.3  Requiring the correct name on a federal tax lien filing, however, is
not unduly burdensome on the government.  The IRS is certainly as capable
as a secured creditor of ensuring that it has filed its claimed interest under the
correct name of a registered organization.
In In re Spearing Tool, the Sixth Circuit gave an IRS federal tax lien
priority over a competing security interest of a secured creditor.4  The creditor
never received notice of the tax lien, because the IRS had filed the lien under
an imprecise variation of the corporate debtor’s registered name.5  This
imprecision led to the federal tax lien never being revealed during the
creditor’s electronic searches for other encumbrances on the debtor’s assets.6
Instead of focusing on the conduct of the IRS to determine if it had provided
sufficient notice of its interest, the court focused on the searches of the secured
creditor, placing the burden on the creditor to show that it had done all it could
to discover the federal tax lien.7  The Sixth Circuit, however, should have
placed the burden on the IRS to provide the correct legal name of the debtor
on its federal tax lien notice, not on a subsequent creditor to guess under which
name the IRS filed the lien.  The Sixth Circuit could have done so by adopting
the new test developed in Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9, which
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8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 40 U.S.C.).
10. This note focuses on the sufficiency of the designation used by the IRS when it files
notice of a federal tax lien on the property of a registered organization, as defined in U.C.C.
section 9-102.  See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70) (amended 2001), 3 U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2006) (defining
a “registered organization” as “an organization organized solely under the law of a single State
or the United States and as to which the State or the United States must maintain a public record
showing the organization to have been organized”).  A related issue is the sufficiency of the
designation of tax debtors other than registered organizations, such as an individual taxpayer
or a partnership not having an official name registered with the secretary of state that is readily
accessible and verifiable.  While many aspects of these issues are the same, different
considerations could be involved.  But cf. Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, Kansas Secretary of
State Speaks on “Nickname” Filing Issue, CLARKS’ SECURED TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY, Mar.
2004, at 3, 5 (arguing that “[t]he same principles apply to individual debtor names,” and “[i]n
both situations, the courts should place the burden where it belongs — on the filing party and
not on subsequent searchers to guess at possible typographical, spelling or other errors which
render the filing invisible to the computer search logic.  The object is to get it right, not close.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
XXAdditionally, two other issues involve meshing the FTLA with Revised Article 9 that, while
not presented in In re Spearing Tool, deserve mention: (1) when the debtor is a registered
organization, in which state should a federal tax lien notice be filed, and (2) where in that state
should the notice be filed.  First, the FTLA and the regulations enforcing it require the notice
of a federal tax lien to be filed in the state where a taxpayer “resides,” which is defined for a
registered organization as the state where it has its “principal executive office.”  I.R.C.
§ 6323(f)(2) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-1(b) (as amended in 1994).  U.C.C. filings,
however, are filed in the state where the organization is registered.  U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (amended
2000), 3 U.L.A. 169 (2002).  Therefore, if a corporation is incorporated in Delaware but has its
principal executive office in Oklahoma, then a third party searching for encumbrances on the
assets of the corporation must search with the Delaware central filing office for U.C.C.
provides a simplified and objective standard for determining the sufficiency
of a name designation on a notice.  Adoption of the Revised Article 9 standard
would have allowed a secured creditor to be assured it has conducted a
thorough enough search to prevent the federal government from claiming
priority to property in which the creditor has a security interest.  The court
decided against this approach, instead providing a ruling that only adds to the
confusion generated by a long line of bad case law.8  
Part II of this note examines the relevant provisions of both the Federal Tax
Lien Act of 1966 (FTLA)9 and Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), as well as the erratic and often contradictory prior case law that
led to the adoption of the rule in Revised Article 9.  Part III examines the facts
leading up to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Spearing Tool and sets forth
the court’s reasoning in holding for the IRS.  Part IV analyzes the reasoning
and policy considerations used by the Sixth Circuit in In re Spearing Tool and
compares them to the better policy under Revised Article 9.10
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financing statements and conduct separate searches with the Oklahoma central filing office for
federal tax liens.  This is inefficient as it results in the need to conduct multiple searches.  The
FTLA should be amended to incorporate the Article 9 rule which, like the U.C.C. section 9-503
rule on sufficient designations, is objectively verifiable and can increase certainty and accuracy
over the more subjective and fact-dependent principal executive office rule currently used by
the FTLA.  
XXSecond, under Revised Article 9, nearly all financing statements are filed with the secretary
of state’s office for each state, with the only exceptions being for as-extracted collateral, timber
to be cut, and fixtures, which are still filed locally in the county in which they are located.
U.C.C. § 9-501 (amended 2000), 3. U.L.A. 341 (2002).  Under the Uniform Federal Lien
Registration Act (UFLRA), however, only federal liens against the personal property of
corporations, partnerships, trusts, and decedents’ estates are required to be filed in the secretary
of state’s office.  UNIF. FED. LIEN REGISTRATION ACT § 2(c)(1)-(3), 7A U.L.A. pt. I, at 337-38
(2002).  With regard to all other taxpayers, the UFLRA permits states to designate any office
for the filing of federal liens, with the result being that many states use local county offices.  Id.
§ 2(c)(4), 7A U.L.A. pt. I, at 338.  This also results in an inefficient and unnecessary need to
conduct multiple searches for interests in personal property.
11. See U.C.C. art. 9, Adoption of Revised Article 9 (2000), 3 U.L.A. 14-18 (2002).
12. See, e.g., Citizens Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Star Auto. Warehouse, Inc. (In re
Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc.), 39 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision), 1994
WL 637047; In re Mines Tire Co., 194 B.R. 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996).
13. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
II. The Federal Tax Lien Act, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9,
and the Case Law Prior to In re Spearing Tool
Determining the priority relationships among federal tax liens and other
third-party interests is a function of both the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 and
Revised Article 9 of the U.C.C., which has been adopted in all fifty states.11
Until the recent revisions to Article 9, courts used the same standard for both
U.C.C. financing statements and federal tax lien filings to resolve whether the
filer had sufficiently identified the debtor so as to provide notice to third
parties of its interest in the debtor’s property.12  The case law that developed
under this standard, however, demonstrated the need for a better test.  In
recognition of this need, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws created a more commercially reasonable standard in
Revised Article 9, which the Sixth Circuit should have adopted for federal tax
lien filings.
A. Playing Fair: Notice Under the Federal Tax Lien Act
In 1913, Congress first enacted legislation regarding federal tax liens to
protect the rights of certain other creditors.13  Congress wanted to safeguard
certain creditor interests against secret federal tax liens and, thus, required the
public filing of the tax lien before it could become effective against these
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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14. Id.; see also United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 89 (1963).  The
legislation initially protected the interests of mortgagees, purchasers, and judgment creditors,
see ch. 166, 37 Stat. at 1016, and was later broadened to include pledgees and holders of certain
securities, see, e.g., Federal Tax Lien Act sec. 101, § 6323(a), 80 Stat. at 1125.
15. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 524 (1998).
16. See I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323 (2000).
17. Manalis Fin. Co. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1980) (third alteration
in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-1884, at 1-2 (1966)).
18. I.R.C. § 6321.
19. Id. § 6323.
20. Id. § 6323(f)(1)(A)(ii).  Former Article 9 of the U.C.C. also required security interests
to be filed in the state where the property was located.  See U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995), 3A U.L.A.
373 (2002).  Revised Article 9, however, requires for security interests to be filed, in most cases,
where the debtor is located, as determined under section 9-307.  See U.C.C. § 9-301 & cmt.
(amended 2000), 3 U.L.A. 154 (2002).
21. I.R.C. § 6323(f)(3).
interests.14  While examining the history of the federal tax lien in a recent
decision, the United States Supreme Court stated that “in sum, each time
Congress revisited the federal tax lien, it ameliorated its original harsh impact
on other secured creditors of the delinquent taxpayer.”15  The FTLA
significantly amended the Internal Revenue Code’s priority rules for federal
tax liens by providing more protections for the interests of secured creditors.16
“[C]onform[ing] the lien provisions of the internal revenue laws to the
concepts developed in [the] Uniform Commercial Code” was one of the key
purposes of the amendments, aimed at improving “the status of private secured
creditors.”17  
The relevant portion of the FTLA is located in §§ 6321 through 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).  Section 6321 of the FTLA grants a lien in
favor of the United States on all the real and personal property of any
delinquent taxpayer for the amount of the tax deficiency.18  Such federal tax
liens, however, are subject to the priority rules set forth in I.R.C. § 6323,
which provide the key safeguards protecting the interests of secured creditors
under the U.C.C.  Section 6323 provides that a federal tax lien imposed by the
IRS under § 6321 will not be valid against the interests of other secured parties
until notice of the government’s claim has been properly filed by the Secretary
of the Treasury.19  Such notice must be filed, “[i]n the case of personal
property, whether tangible or intangible, in one office within the State . . . as
designated by the laws of such State, in which the property subject to the lien
is situated.”20  Additionally, § 6323(f)(3) provides that the Secretary of the
Treasury will prescribe the form and content of the required notice of the
liens.21  Thus, the FTLA preempts state law such that the notice prescribed by




23. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-1(d) (as amended in 1994).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Tony Thornton Auction Serv., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 635, 639 (8th
Cir. 1986).
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part II.C (discussing the test in U.C.C. Revised Article 9).
28. Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, Sixth Circuit Rules IRS Exempt from UCC Filing
Requirements, Creating New Searching Headaches for Secured Lenders, CLARKS’ SECURED
TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY, July 2005, at 1, 3.
regarding the form or content of a notice of lien.”22  In addition to the statute,
the Treasury Regulations require that the notice be filed on Form 668 —
Notice of Federal Tax Lien Under Internal Revenue Laws and that the notice
“identify the taxpayer, the tax liability giving rise to the lien, and the date the
assessment arose.”23
While the regulations provide the form to be used by the IRS for filing
notices, the statute and the regulations contain gaps that fail to set forth
specifics for completing the form.  Significantly, the precise requirements for
the designation used by the IRS on the filing are not prescribed by the FTLA.
The Treasury Regulations merely provide that the filing must “identify” the
taxpayer without stating what constitutes sufficient identification.24
Previously, courts used the “reasonably diligent searcher” standard to
determine whether the filing sufficiently identified the taxpayer so as to satisfy
the requirement that the IRS provide notice of its lien.  This highly subjective
and fact-intensive test was used to determine the sufficiency of U.C.C. filings
under former Article 9,25 but led to unpredictable, inconsistent outcomes.26
Because of the many problems this test posed for U.C.C. filings, the authors
of Revised Article 9 replaced it with a much more workable standard
developed in section 9-503.27  Instead of adopting the Revised Article 9
standard for federal tax lien filings, the Sixth Circuit merely recharacterized
the previously used standard as a “reasonable and diligent electronic search”
to account for the fact that Michigan uses an electronic filing system.  After
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Spearing Tool, it has been suggested that
the FTLA should once again be updated to conform to Revised Article 9 and
that courts should adopt the Revised Article 9 test to determine the sufficiency
of the name used in federal tax lien filings.28
B. Into the Morass: Case Law Prior to In re Spearing Tool
The case law prior to the decision in In re Spearing Tool followed the
“reasonably diligent searcher” standard.  This standard had originally
developed to determine the sufficiency of notice for U.C.C. filings under
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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29. Tony Thornton Auction Serv., 791 F.2d at 639.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
31. Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, In Filing Federal Tax Lien Notices, IRS Need Not
Follow New UCC Rules Governing Debtor Names, CLARKS’ SECURED TRANSACTIONS
MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 1, 3.
32. Marsha E. Simms, Introduction to Secured Lending and Commercial Finance, in ASSET
BASED FINANCING 2005, at 9, 21 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. A-878, 2005).
33. Compare Richter’s Loan Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1956)
(misspelling Friedlander), with Haye v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1978)
(misspelling Castillo).
former Article 9.29  As described above,30 the test is fact-intensive and has
resulted in “muddled” case law that is inconsistent and unhelpful in guiding
future decisions regarding both federal tax lien filings and U.C.C. financing
statements.31  The test was developed at a time when all filings were indexed
alphabetically in books that could be physically searched.  In such situations,
imperfect or imprecise debtor name variations were likely to be found on the
same page as the debtor’s correct name.  Because of the many problems
resulting from the subjective nature of the reasonably diligent searcher
standard, replacing it with a new test, like the one developed in Revised
Article 9, was desirable whether or not the technology of filing notices
changed.  The change to electronic filing and search systems, however, has
only further complicated what was already a confusing test.32 
As demonstrated in the body of case law using the reasonably diligent
searcher standard, this test could not be objectively applied; rather, the
outcome of each particular case depended entirely on the circumstances
surrounding the individual case and, thus, did not provide adequate guidance
for resolving future conflicts.   Cases with extremely similar fact patterns but
heard in different jurisdictions often resulted in completely disparate
outcomes.  Because courts attempted to determine whether the name used to
identify a taxpayer gave sufficient notice of a federal tax lien to a third party,
the outcomes of these cases were heavily dependent on each state’s system for
filing notices.  A misspelling or misdesignation that, on account of a particular
state’s filing system, resulted in the notice being filed on the same page as if
it had correctly designated the taxpayer would constitute sufficient
identification, whereas the same misspelling or misdesignation could
constitute insufficient identification in another state because that state’s system
would cause the notice to be filed ten pages away.  Furthermore, misspelling
“Friedlander” as “Freidlander” still sufficiently identified the taxpayer in one
jurisdiction, but misspelling “Castillo” as “Castello” rendered the notice of
federal tax lien ineffective in another.33  In one instance an incorrect middle
initial was determined not to affect the sufficiency of notice, while in other
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss3/5
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34. Compare Brightwell v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1464 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (finding that
the notice of a federal tax lien was sufficient even though it stated the incorrect middle initial
for a taxpayer and inserted an extra space in his last name), with Fritschler, Pellino, Schrank &
Rosen, S.C. v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that an incorrect
middle initial rendered the notice of a federal tax lien invalid), and Cont’l Invs. v. United States,
142 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Tenn. 1953) (same).
35. Tony Thornton Auction Serv., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1986).
36. Focht v. United States (In re Focht), 243 B.R. 263, 266-67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999).
37. Hudgins v. IRS (In re Hudgins), 967 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1992).
38. Id.
39. United States v. Crestmark Bank (In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.), 412 F.3d 653, 656
(6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 41 (2006).
40. Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, Kansas Bankruptcy Court Okays Debtor’s Nickname
instances the incorrect middle initial invalidated otherwise properly filed
liens.34  Such case inconsistencies only increased the confusion surrounding
the application of the standard.  
The cases the Sixth Circuit cited in In re Spearing Tool to support its
holding are no less troublesome than those discussed above.  The Sixth Circuit
cited these cases for the proposition that the IRS does not have to identify the
taxpayer perfectly in its federal tax lien filings.  In Tony Thornton Auction
Service, Inc. v. United States, a case the Sixth Circuit relied on in In re
Spearing Tool, the Eighth Circuit held that notice of a federal tax lien against
a restaurant was valid even though the notice contained only the names of the
husband and the restaurant, but not the name of the wife who was a business
partner.35  In a later case, however, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Pennsylvania declined to follow Thornton, holding a notice of federal tax lien
insufficient against an individual partner, where the notice only identified the
partnership and the individual’s wife as general partner.36  In In re Hudgins,
a second case cited by the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit held that a notice
of lien filed against “Hudgins Masonry Inc.” did not sufficiently identify the
individual taxpayer Michael Hudgins.37  Therefore, the filing provided
constructive notice with regard to business-related assets only, but not against
nonbusiness assets.38  Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re
Spearing Tool only dragged the problems and inconsistencies presented by the
prior case law into the computer age, by recharacterizing the old reasonably
diligent searcher standard as the “reasonable and diligent electronic search.”39
C. Commercial Reasonableness: The Revisions to U.C.C. Article 9
The same notice problems that plagued the courts hearing federal tax lien
cases afflicted U.C.C. financing statement litigation.  The need to increase
commercial certainty with regard to filing requirements prompted the revisions
to Article 9.40  Precision, certainty, and predictability are very important to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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on UCC Financing Statement, CLARKS’ SECURED TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 3,
5.
41. Id.
42. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h) (amended 2000), 3 U.L.A. 44-46 (2002).
43. Id. § 9-506 cmt. 2, 3 U.L.A. 363 (2002).
44. Simms, supra note 32, at 21.
45. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1), 3 U.L.A. 357 (2002).
46. Clark & Clark, supra note 28, at 2.  The clear rule is “one of the major advantages of
Revised Article 9.”  Id.
47. Stephen D. Sayre & Darrell Pierce, Secured Lenders Beware: IRS Plays by Its Own
Rules in Filing Federal Tax Liens, SECURED LENDER, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 28, 28.
48. Id.
sustain an effective and efficient filing system.41  Specifically, a new test for
determining the sufficiency of name designations on U.C.C. notice-filings was
needed to replace the convoluted case law that had developed around the old
“reasonably diligent searcher” standard and to account for the changes in
technology that led to the adoption of computerized filing systems by the state
records offices.  Sections 9-503 and 9-506 were revisions adopted to provide
clear standards for establishing a debtor’s correct name and for determining
when an incorrect name on a financing statement is insufficient.42  The Article
9 revisions were designed to clarify the filing requirements in order to
“discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of statutory
requirements in which courts occasionally had indulged themselves.”43  In
today’s environment, the stricter requirements of Revised Article 9 are
especially helpful because “[t]he advent of computer searches has only added
to the confusion” caused by the bad case law developed under the old
reasonably diligent searcher standard.44  
The Revised Article 9 test is found in U.C.C. section 9-503(a)(1).  It
provides that, when the debtor is a registered organization, a financing
statement sufficiently identifies the debtor only if it uses the name indicated
on the public record registered in the jurisdiction where the debtor was
organized.45  This requirement in Revised Article 9 enhances certainty and
predictability by creating a clear rule for U.C.C. filings.46  The test under
Revised Article 9 is both objective and practical.47  As long as a searcher can
accurately determine the debtor’s correct legal name and its jurisdiction of
organization, that searcher need only run one search to discover any and all
prior U.C.C. security interests filed against the debtor.48  This rule allows a
lender to know both that the search under the debtor’s correct legal name has
revealed all prior interests that could be effective against its own interest, and
that the lender’s own security interest if filed under this same name will
constitute sufficient notice of its interest to later creditors.  The Revised Article
9 rule increases certainty and predictability, and decreases litigation over the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss3/5
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49. Clark & Clark, supra note 28, at 2; Sayre & Pierce, supra note 47, at 28, 30, 32.
50. Sayre & Pierce, supra note 47, at 30; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
51. U.C.C. § 9-506(a) (amended 2000), 3 U.L.A. 362 (2002).
52. Id. § 9-506(b)-(c), 3 U.L.A. 362-63 (2002).
53. The standard computer search logic of the Michigan Secretary of State’s office
contained this type of programmable departure.  See United States v. Crestmark Bank (In re
Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.), 412 F.3d 653, 655 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 41
(2006).
sufficiency of the name.49  The revision also reduces transaction costs by
eliminating the expense of conducting multiple searches, as well as through
minimizing incorrect matches and the resulting due diligence costs required to
determine the applicability of those incorrect matches.50  
Not all errors in a name designation, however, are fatal.  Section 9-506(a)
provides that minor errors or omissions will not render a financing statement
inneffective, unless the errors or omissions make the financing statement
seriously misleading.51  The test to determine if an error is seriously misleading
is provided in subsections (b) and (c) of section 9-506, which provide that a
financing statement is per se seriously misleading when it fails to use the name
of the debtor required by section 9-503(a); if, however, a financing statement
with an error in the name is disclosed during “a search of the records of the
filing office under the debtor’s correct name, using the filing office’s standard
search logic, if any, . . . [then] the name provided does not make the financing
statement seriously misleading.”52  Thus, if an incorrectly named financing
statement shows up in the search results when a third party searches for
encumbrances under a debtor’s correct name, then the incorrect designation
suffices to put the searcher on notice of the secured party’s interest in the
property of the debtor.  For example, the search logic of the computerized
filing system in many states is programmed so that a notice of lien filed under
“ABC Co.” will be disclosed when a search is run for “ABC Inc.”53  In such
a case, the imprecise variation in the designation is not “seriously misleading”
under the standard set forth in section 9-506 and, therefore, sufficiently
provides the name of the debtor.  Regarding U.C.C. financing statements,
courts have embraced the revised test and abandoned the reasonably diligent
searcher standard and its attendant problems.  
III. In re Spearing Tool & Manufacturing Co.
In re Spearing Tool represented the first opportunity for a federal court of
appeals to examine the issue of the sufficiency of a name designation in a
notice of federal tax lien since the revisions to Article 9.  The Sixth Circuit
decided In re Spearing Tool on June 21, 2005, after receiving it on appeal
from the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and the United
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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54. Id. at 653.
55. See U.C.C. art. 9, Adoption of Revised Article 9 (2000), 3 U.L.A. 14-18 (2002).
56. In re Spearing Tool, 412 F.3d at 654.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9503(1) (West 2003) (correlating to U.C.C. § 9-
503(a)(1)).




64. Michigan uses a computerized filing system; third parties searching for notices of liens
must submit the name of the debtor to the Secretary of State’s office, which then enters the
name into its electronic search system and returns the results to the third party.  Id. at 655.
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.54  Even though
Revised Article 9 had been quickly adopted by all fifty states, as well as by the
District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands,55 the Sixth Circuit chose not
to apply the uniform standard created in those revisions equally to the U.S.
government.
A. Facts
Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co. entered into a lending agreement
with Crestmark Bank in April of 1998.56  Spearing granted Crestmark a
security interest in all of its assets, including its accounts receivable, which
Crestmark perfected by filing a U.C.C. financing statement.57  The financing
statement identified Spearing by its exact name as it was registered with the
Michigan Secretary of State,58 as required by Michigan law.59  In April, 2001,
Crestmark entered into a secured financing arrangement with Spearing, under
which Crestmark agreed to purchase accounts receivable from Spearing in
exchange for a secured interest in all of Spearing’s assets.60  Crestmark filed
a U.C.C. financing statement to perfect its security interest, using Spearing’s
precise registered name.61  Because Spearing had fallen behind in its federal
employment-tax payments, federal tax liens arose upon all of Spearing’s
property, and on October 15, 2001, the IRS filed two notices of its interest in
Spearing’s assets with the Michigan Secretary of State’s office.62  The IRS,
however, filed the notices of the tax liens under the name “SPEARING TOOL
& MFG. COMPANY INC.,” not the organization’s precise registered name,
“Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co.”63
Because of Michigan’s filing system and the manner in which searches must
be conducted,64 the IRS’s use of an ampersand and the abbreviation “Mfg.”
frustrated Crestmark’s subsequent searches for encumbrances on Spearing’s






68. Crestmark Bank v. United States (In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.), 302 B.R. 351, 352-
53 (E.D. Mich. 2003), rev’d, 412 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 41 (2006).
69. In re Spearing Tool, 412 F.3d at 654.
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periodic lien search requests to the Michigan Secretary of State to determine
whether any encumbrances existed on Spearing’s assets.65  Crestmark made the
requests using Spearing’s precise registered name.66  Because the tax lien
notices were not filed under Spearing’s precise registered name, the IRS tax
liens were not disclosed to Crestmark in the search results.67  In reliance on the
absence of liens revealed by search results, Crestmark advanced funds to
Spearing between October 15, 2001, the date the IRS filed its notices under the
incorrect name, and April 6, 2002.68  Repayment was secured by Spearing’s
assets.69
Spearing filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on April 16, 2002.70  Two
days later, the Bankruptcy Court entered a consent order providing “for a
$200,000 reserve account to be managed by Crestmark and funded by pre-
petition accounts receivable collections.”71  The reserve account held
$153,058.33 — the amount in controversy between Crestmark and the IRS.72
Crestmark claimed that the funds in the reserve account belonged to it based
on its perfected security interest, while the IRS claimed priority based on its
federal tax lien.73  The Bankruptcy Court’s order “reserved for future
determination the respective rights of Crestmark and the IRS in the account
balance.”74  On September 20, 2002, Crestmark filed a complaint to determine
lien priority, which would resolve whether Crestmark or the IRS possessed the
right to the funds in the reserve account.75  The Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the
government, while the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan reversed, determining that Crestmark had priority.76
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B. The Sixth Circuit’s Holding and Reasoning
The Sixth Circuit framed the issues as “whether state or federal law
determines the sufficiency of the IRS’s tax-lien notices, and whether the IRS
notices sufficed to give the IRS liens priority.”77  The Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary
judgment for the government.  The Sixth Circuit held that federal law governs
the form and content of the tax-lien notices, and that the notice in this case
sufficed.78
The Sixth Circuit quoted I.R.C. § 6323(f)(3) and Treasury Regulation
section 301.6323(f)-1(d)(1) to determine whether federal law controlled the
form and content of the IRS’s tax-lien notices.79  These provisions expressly
provide that the Federal Tax Lien Act preempts state law, and therefore the act
and the regulations implementing it control the form and content of the
filings.80  Thus, the court stated that all it needed to determine was whether the
notice provided by the filing of the federal tax liens was sufficient to give the
IRS priority over Crestmark’s competing interest.81
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis as to whether the IRS notices
sufficiently identified Spearing to give the liens priority over Crestmark’s
security interest by citing Tony Thornton Auction Service, Inc. v. United
States.82  The court held that an erroneous name sufficiently identifies a
taxpayer if a “reasonable and diligent search would have revealed the existence
of the notices of the federal tax liens under these names.”83  Because Michigan
uses an electronic-search system, however, the court ruled that previous case
law was not relevant and that, therefore, the question was “whether Crestmark
conducted a reasonable and diligent electronic search.”84  The court held that
the abbreviations used in the liens were common, and that “Crestmark had
notice that Spearing sometimes used [the] abbreviations, and the Michigan
Secretary of State’s office recommended a search using the abbreviations.”85
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Sixth Circuit concluded that Crestmark did not perform a reasonable and
diligent electronic search.86  
The court limited its decision, however, to the exact facts presented before
it, expressly stating that it had “no opinion about whether creditors have a
general obligation to search name variations.”87  The court then cited policy
considerations for its holding, stating that requiring the government to put the
taxpayer’s correct name on the tax liens would be “unduly burdensome.”88
The Sixth Circuit also held that requiring the federal government to conform
to the different identification requirements of each state’s electronic search
technology “would run counter to the principle of uniformity which has long
been the accepted practice in the field of federal taxation,” quoting language
from the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Union Central Life Insurance
Co.89  Finally, citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,90 the Sixth Circuit
stated that the need for prompt, effective tax collection trumps any
inconvenience that results for secured creditors.91
IV. Analysis: The Flawed Approach of the Sixth Circuit and the Better
Policy of Revised Article 9
After the Sixth Circuit created its “new” standard in In re Spearing Tool, it
summarily concluded that Crestmark did not meet this standard.  The court
provided no guidance for determining how a searcher meets the standard, or
even if a searcher actually has any duty at all to search name variations under
it.  Furthermore, the court attempted to bolster its conclusion upon a policy of
uniformity in federal taxation without defining uniformity in this context or
how uniformity would be threatened by requiring the IRS to use a taxpayer’s
registered name on its federal tax lien filings.  The court should have adopted
the Revised Article 9 standard because it would have established a clear,
beneficial test for both searchers and the IRS, would have reduced litigation
over this issue, and would not have been burdensome on the IRS.
A. Continuing the Confusion: The Sixth Circuit’s Not-So-New Standard
The court’s decision in In re Spearing Tool presents two main problems.
First, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis overly discounted the importance of the
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individual state’s filing system in determining whether notice is sufficient, and
misconstrued the stated policy of uniformity in the field of tax collection from
the Kimbell Foods and Union Central Life Insurance cases.  Second, the Sixth
Circuit announced a new test for determining whether notice provided in an
electronic search system is sufficient, but did not provide any guidance on how
that test should be used in future cases.  In reality, the court created a test no
different than the old reasonably diligent searcher standard that Revised
Article 9 replaced as unworkable.
1. The Fall-Back Policy: The “Principle of Uniformity”
The Sixth Circuit cited both Kimbell Foods and Union Central Life
Insurance for a “principle of uniformity” that required the court not to “subject
the federal government to different identification requirements . . . varying
with each state’s electronic-search technology.”92  This policy argument is
troubling as the court determined that it must disregard the individual state’s
method for filing notices while, at the same time, it observed that Michigan’s
use of an electronic-search system required a different standard than what
would be used in a jurisdiction with a physical index.93  In analyzing this case,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded
that, when courts apply the reasonable and diligent search test to determine
sufficiency of notice, they “necessarily consider the recording method
employed by the state or county.”94  The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that a
local system of recording notices does make a difference in analyzing whether
that notice is sufficient, at least to some extent, when it judged Crestmark’s
search by a reasonable and diligent electronic search standard as opposed to
the standard of a reasonable and diligent search of a physical index.95
Prior case law also weakens the Sixth Circuit’s “principle of uniformity”
policy argument.  In much of the prior case law, courts have indeed taken into
account the individual state’s filing system to determine whether appropriate
or sufficient notice was given, as the district court stated.96  In fact, the cases
the Sixth Circuit cited as suggesting that a federal tax lien does not need to
identify the taxpayer perfectly were decided after taking into consideration the
respective state’s lien index.97  In discussing In re Hudgins,98 where a lien that
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should have been filed against “Michael Hudgins” was incorrectly filed against
“Hudgins Masonry, Inc.,” the Sixth Circuit explained that the “notice
nonetheless sufficed, given that both names would be listed on the same page
of the state’s lien index.”99  The outcome of this case was heavily influenced
by the individual state’s filing system, because, had the filing system been
altered so that the two names would not have been listed on the same page, the
notice probably would not have sufficed.  Thus, it seems incongruous for the
Sixth Circuit to later state that, based on a policy consideration of uniformity,
a state’s system will not be a factor in determining IRS compliance with the
notice requirement.100  Whether termed a reasonable and diligent search or a
reasonable and diligent electronic search, under a subjective, fact-dependent
test, the individual state’s method of searching for notices must play a part in
the decision.
Additionally, because every state has adopted Revised Article 9, the Sixth
Circuit’s fears that uniformity would be undermined are misplaced.101
Requiring the IRS to file federal tax liens under a company’s correct registered
name according to U.C.C. section 9-503(a)(1) would better serve a policy of
uniformity, because a creditor would discover the federal tax lien in its search
regardless of the standard or logic employed in the particular state.  Any
system would reveal a lien filed under a debtor company’s correct name as
registered with the Secretary of State, and notice of the federal tax lien would,
therefore, be sufficient.  Thus, with such a rule, the IRS would not be subjected
to “different identification requirements . . . varying with each state’s
electronic-search technology,” as the Sixth Circuit worried.102  Rather, the
U.C.C. provision would promote a single uniform identification requirement
that would not depend upon each state’s individual system for filing notices.
Not only would such a requirement better serve a policy of uniformity, it
would also greatly decrease litigation over the issue of sufficient notice, thus
cleaning up prior convoluted case law.
Furthermore, requiring the designation to fit within the test developed by
Revised Article 9 would accord with federal preemption.  The Sixth Circuit
noted that the form used by the IRS is valid regardless of state-law provisions
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addressing form or content of the lien notice.103  As the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan emphasized, however, “filling out a form
correctly does not implicate the same concerns as creating a different form for
different states,”104 which was the Supreme Court’s main concern in Union
Central Life Insurance.  Adoption of the standard in U.C.C. section 9-503 in
no way would impair the IRS’s ability to use its Form-668 for notice in all
fifty states.
In further support of its policy of uniformity, the Sixth Circuit cited Kimbell
Foods in its conclusion that “prompt, effective tax collection trumps”
inconveniences caused to secured creditors.105  In relying on Kimbell Foods to
support this conclusion, however, the Sixth Circuit disregarded much of what
the U.S. Supreme Court stated in that case.  In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme
Court examined lien priority resulting from federally guaranteed loans of SBA
and FHA lending programs, and not federal tax liens.106  Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court stated that federal revenue policy must consider existing credit
markets and state priority rules, and that protective measures must be in place
so that federal revenue policy is carried out in a manner that is not disruptive
to these systems.107  The Supreme Court even cited the Federal Tax Lien Act
of 1966 as providing “evidence that treating the United States like any other
lender would not undermine federal interests.”108  The Supreme Court quoted
the Senate report, indicating that the purpose of these amendments was to
prevent the impairment of secured commercial financing transactions by
“moderniz[ing] . . . the relationship of Federal tax liens to the interests of other
creditors.”109  According to the Supreme Court, courts must consider
congressionally placed limitations to protect creditors against unrestricted
federal priority when courts attempt to fill in the gaps left by Congress.110  The
sufficiency of designations on federal tax lien notices is one of these gaps.
When the regulations merely state that the notice of federal tax liens must
“identify the taxpayer,” courts must determine how that should be done.  The
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Supreme Court stated in Kimbell Foods that courts should look to the U.C.C.
as nondiscriminatory state law to govern this area left open by Congress.111
The Supreme Court earlier recognized this policy in the commercial arena in
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States112 when it stated that as a drawee of
commercial paper, the United States stands in no better position than any other
drawee, and that “the United States does business on business terms.”113
2. The Hollow Test: No Standards, No Precedence, No Guidance
Both the manner in which the Sixth Circuit established its new standard of
a reasonable and diligent electronic search and the approach it took in applying
this standard are problematic.  Because the physical index is on its way to
extinction, the court stated that the old standard of the reasonable and diligent
search and the cases that promote that standard “mean little here.”114  This
realization, however, came only after the court used those cases to frame its
“critical issue” in In re Spearing Tool, namely, that whether the IRS
sufficiently identified Spearing depended on “whether a ‘reasonable and
diligent search would have revealed the existence of the notices of the federal
tax liens under these names.’”115  Further, although the court announced the
new reasonable and diligent electronic search test,116 the court failed to explain
how one conducts such a search, or how a searcher satisfies the test.  The court
merely concluded that, in this case, the creditor should have searched under
different variations of the debtor’s name.117  The court, however, was unwilling
to extend this obligation beyond the facts of this particular case.118  According
to the Sixth Circuit, variations including the abbreviation “Mfg.” and the
ampersand are “of course, most common abbreviations,” and, therefore,
Crestmark should have conducted searches using them.119  This conclusion,
however, left open the question as to which abbreviations are in the category
of “most common abbreviations.”  The court did not give any insight into this
issue.  It simply explained that these two abbreviations are “so common that,
for example, we use them as a rule in our case citations.”120
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Undoubtedly, the court was influenced by the fact that the Michigan
Secretary of State’s office had suggested that Crestmark search under the name
variation.121  Unfortunately for Crestmark, the Sixth Circuit focused on the fact
that Crestmark received a handwritten note included in its search results from
the Secretary of State’s office recommending that it search under the name
“Spearing Tool & Mfg. Company, Inc.”122  The court’s reliance on this note
as evidence that Crestmark did not conduct a reasonable and diligent electronic
search has been criticized as an exercise of twenty-twenty hindsight.123
Regardless, the Sixth Circuit still faulted Crestmark for failing to search using
an incorrect name instead of faulting the IRS for filing the notice under the
incorrect name in the first place.124  Thus, this evidence is not as persuasive as
it first appears, and should not have distracted the court from the more
important policy issue in the case.
The Sixth Circuit’s creation of a new test was based on short-sighted
considerations and is problematic for future litigants.  After creating a new
test, the court limited its holding to the particular facts in this case, stating,
“We express no opinion about whether creditors have a general obligation to
search name variations.”125  The Sixth Circuit failed to provide an example of
what constitutes a reasonable and diligent electronic search.  The court did not
determine what variations a creditor must consider when searching for federal
tax liens.  The court did not even determine if a creditor has a duty to search
name variations at all.  Thus, In re Spearing Tool provides no guidance on
how the Sixth Circuit will decide, or how any other court should decide, the
issue of sufficient notice when an incorrect name is used in the future.  Rather
than adopting the clear rules of U.C.C. sections 9-503(a)(1) and 9-506 to
provide guidance, the court indicated that this issue will be decided on a case-
by-case basis that completely depends on facts before the court.  Such a ruling
completely frustrates the court’s stated policy goal of uniformity and will only
lead to costly litigation each time a case presents this issue.  The ruling in In
re Spearing Tool makes searching for federal tax liens a guessing game, and
produces a test that is as equally problematic as its predecessor.
B. Revised Article 9: Placing the Burden Where It Belongs
The reasonable and diligent electronic search standard set forth by the Sixth
Circuit places the burden on the searcher rather than the filer in determining
whether the IRS filing provided sufficient notice of the federal tax lien.  The
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test focuses on whether the searcher did enough to gain notice of the federal
tax lien instead of focusing on whether the IRS did enough to provide adequate
notice to third parties of its interest in the debtor’s property.  The use of such
a standard is not the best policy.126  It places the risk of insufficient notice on
the searcher when the IRS, as the secured party, could easily prevent the
problem by filing under the debtor’s correct name in the first place.
The better policy is that set forth in Revised Article 9.  The filing rules of
Revised Article 9 place the burden of providing sufficient notice on the
secured party filing the notice,127 because this party is in the best position to
ensure that notice problems never arise.  Part five of Revised Article 9, which
governs filing, was “substantially rewritten to simplify the statutory text and
to deal with numerous problems of interpretation and implementation that have
arisen over the years.”128  Recognizing the problems of the subjective standard,
the authors of Revised Article 9 created a practical test that made determining
whether a name is sufficient objectively verifiable.
The Sixth Circuit should have adopted the Revised Article 9 test as the
standard for the sufficiency of designations on federal tax lien notices.  In In
re Kinderknecht129 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit cited
“four practical considerations” for requiring financing statements to state the
debtor’s legal name pursuant to U.C.C. section 9-503.130  Such a requirement
(1) sets a clear test for filers, (2) sets a clear test for searchers, (3) will avoid
litigation, and (4) is not burdensome on the filer.131  The court held that when
a search conducted under a debtor’s correct name does not disclose any filings,
“parties in interest should be able to presume that the debtor’s property is not
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encumbered, and they should not be charged with guessing what to do next if
the legal name search does not result in any matches.”132  While the Tenth
Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel was not faced directly with a federal tax
lien, the four “practical considerations” are equally applicable when the
creditor is the federal government.  Computer databases have replaced physical
indexes, and the new provisions of Revised Article 9 represent what is
commercially reasonable in the face of new technology.  Crestmark could not
search through a physical index for liens in the U.C.C. filing office, in which
case it probably would have noticed the incorrectly-named federal tax liens.
Instead, Crestmark could only submit the debtor’s name under which it wished
to search for liens to the Secretary of State’s office, whose electronic-search
technology looked only for exact matches.133  Crestmark should have been able
to rely on its searches and not forced to guess other names under which
possible federal tax liens might be filed.
1. Clear Test: Beneficial to IRS as Filer
The first practical consideration provided by the In re Kinderknecht court
was that “mandating the debtor’s legal name sets a clear test so as [to] simplify
the drafting of financing statements.”134  While the IRS would have lost In re
Spearing Tool had the Sixth Circuit adopted the logic of Revised Article 9, a
clear test would have been established to the benefit of the IRS.  For example,
if the IRS uses the debtor’s correct legal name on federal tax lien filings, actual
notice of the lien and the government’s priority on the debtor’s property will
always be provided to the party who searches using the debtor’s correct legal
name.  The IRS would know that it has provided sufficient notice of its interest
to preclude any subsequently filed competing interests from gaining priority
over the federal tax lien.  Thus, the IRS would not be subject to a court’s
interpretation as to whether a later secured party, who claimed no notice of the
IRS lien, conducted a reasonable and diligent electronic search, taking priority
over the IRS.
2. Clear Test: Beneficial to Searchers
Second, the In re Kinderknecht court stated that “setting a clear test
simplifies the parameters of UCC searches.”135  For a third party searching for
encumbrances on the property of a potential borrower, the Sixth Circuit’s
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decision makes the process more difficult and increases uncertainty.136  This
decision will require secured lenders to increase their efforts and costs in
searching for hidden federal tax liens as well as potential federal tax liens that
may not even exist, even though Revised Article 9 has eliminated these
problems when searching for U.C.C. financing statements.137  To discover
potential tax liens, the Sixth Circuit’s test requires Crestmark and other
secured creditors to request as many official searches as it takes to cover
possible variations in the spelling and form of a debtor’s registered name.138
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling leaves open the possibility that the IRS
could use an organization’s trade name on the notice of federal tax lien, an
option explicitly foreclosed to all other secured parties in the Article 9
revisions.139  As a result of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, a third party should also
search for tax liens under trade names and any variations of them to be certain
that no such liens exist.  Thus, a creditor searching for a federal tax lien under
this standard “must guess at not only what variant [the IRS] might have used
but also search under a potentially enormous number of spelling variations.”140
The Eastern District Court of Michigan correctly held that this standard was
unreasonable in today’s environment.141  Under a reasonable and diligent
electronic search standard, as with the reasonably diligent searcher standard
used prior to Revised Article 9, “a searcher would never know when the scope
of the search was adequate, even where the name is objectively verifiable.”142
Conversely, the Article 9 revisions “reduce transaction costs by minimizing
incorrect matches and the corresponding need to conduct further due
diligence” to determine the applicability of the incorrect matches and eliminate
the expense of conducting multiple searches.143  Expanding the boundaries of
one’s search in an attempt to find possible incorrectly designated federal tax
lien filings will produce notices that are not applicable to the subject debtor.
The searcher must then take the necessary steps to determine that these extra
notices do not, in fact, involve the property of the applicable debtor.144  Thus,
in addition to conducting multiple searches, a third-party searcher must then
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inquire into the relevancy of the extra results produced by those searches.  This
inefficiency increases transaction costs by decreasing accuracy and certainty.
The problem with these “fishing expeditions” is that a lot of unnecessary fish
are caught, undermining the efficiency and certainty of the system developed
by Revised Article 9.145  Because a searcher must “cast a wider net . . . to
capture an IRS filing,” the In re Spearing Tool decision forces searchers to be
creative to “bail out dumb filers.”146
In conducting a search for encumbrances on a debtor’s property, the logical
place to begin is with the debtor’s legal name.147  The simplest solution to
problems like the one presented in In re Spearing Tool is requiring the IRS to
provide the correct legal name of the debtor on the filing of the federal tax lien,
possibly preventing the need for litigation in the first place.148  The standard
under Revised Article 9 “does not burden searchers with the obligation to
dream up every potential error and name variation and perform searches under
all possibilities.”149  Instead, a searcher can increase certainty and reduce
transaction costs by relying on a single search to produce all encumbrances on
a debtor’s property.150  As the Michigan federal district court stated in its
holding for Crestmark, “Gone are the days of large alphabetical books, where
a reasonable searcher would likely find a misspelled (or mistakenly
abbreviated) name because it would appear in close proximity to where a lien
with a correctly spelled name would have appeared.”151  In an age where
electronic searching dominates, the policy in Revised Article 9 represents the
standard of what is commercially reasonable.  “Fairness to third parties
dictates” that an IRS lien that would not surface under the Revised Article 9
standard should not have priority over the perfected interests of subsequent
creditors.152
3. Clear Test: Reduction of Litigation
Third, the In re Kinderknecht court proposed that “requiring the debtor’s
legal name will avoid litigation as to the commonality or appropriateness of a
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debtor’s nickname, and as to whether a reasonable searcher would have or
should have known to use the name.”153  As noted, the Sixth Circuit’s
reasonable and diligent electronic search test is another fact-dependent standard
no different than the old reasonably diligent searcher test used prior to the
adoption of Revised Article 9.154  The Sixth Circuit’s decision results in an
inefficient double standard between the filings of the IRS and those of other
creditors, because it requires litigation over the facts and circumstances of the
particular case to determine the sufficiency of the designation.155  Moreover, the
application of the standard is unpredictable because prior case law does not
provide much guidance on how such litigation will be resolved.  Compliance
with the Revised Article 9 standard, however, can easily be ascertained.156  As
the standard for determining the sufficiency of notice of federal tax liens, the
“reasonable and diligent electronic search” standard will only continue to breed
litigation and its attendant expenses.157  The cases that follow the Sixth
Circuit’s test will continue to be as muddled as the previous case law.
4. Clear Test: Not Burdensome on the IRS
The final practical consideration provided by the In re Kinderknecht court
was that “obtaining a debtor’s legal name is not difficult or burdensome for the
creditor taking a secured interest in a debtor’s property.”158  Requiring that the
IRS provide a corporation’s complete legal name on a federal tax lien is not
burdensome on the IRS.159  A corporate debtor’s legal name is included in its
articles of incorporation, an easily accessible public record.160  This information
can also usually be found on the Internet from the secretary of state’s website
for the business’s state of incorporation.161  Such a search is quick and incurs
little to no cost.162  If an ordinary secured lender can verify the debtor’s name
without hardship, there is no reason to think the IRS cannot do the same.
Requiring the IRS to follow the same rules as everyone else also seems to
conform with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Kimbell
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Foods, Inc.  There, the Court held that, as a matter of federal law,
nondiscriminatory state law such as the U.C.C. should govern the priority of
liens favoring the U.S. government.163  Thus, the provisions of the U.C.C.
should apply to determine adequate notice to the extent that adequate notice is
not resolved by the federal statute itself.  Because neither the Federal Tax Lien
Act nor the Treasury Regulations enforcing it specifically provide how the
notices of the liens should identify the taxpayer, but merely state that the
taxpayer should be identified, the identification rules of U.C.C. Revised Article
9 should govern these types of conflicts.  In short, the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Kimbell Foods suggests that it is not burdensome on the federal
government to require it to conduct business on the same terms as its citizens.
V. Conclusion
In the end, In re Spearing Tool produces a standard for judging the
sufficiency of name designations on IRS notices of federal tax liens that is no
different than the old standard.  The Sixth Circuit could have, and should have,
required the IRS to play by the same rules as other secured creditors by
adopting the provisions of U.C.C. Revised Article 9 as the standard for
determining the sufficiency of name designations on IRS tax lien notices.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in this case.164
Therefore, until another jurisdiction rules otherwise or there is once again a
change in the FTLA or the Treasury Regulations to modernize federal tax lien
practice in conformity with the U.C.C., practitioners must be aware of the
possibility of hidden tax liens and cannot rely on the commercially reasonable
standards of the U.C.C.
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